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Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

No. 40553

)

Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant,)
)

v.

)

MATTHEW STEVEN TAYLOR,

)

Defendant-Appellant-Cross
Respondent.

)
)

Ada Co. Case No.
CR-2011-15480

)

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The statement of the case is set forth in the Brief of Respondent, p. 1, and
is incorporated here by reference. This Court granted Taylor leave to file a
supplemental brief by order dated May 14, 2014.1

The Order treated the legal argument in Taylor's motion as the supplemental
brief. The state therefore cites to the motion as Taylor's "supplemental brief."
1

1

ISSUE PRESENTED IN SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING
Taylor included no statement of a new issue in his supplemental brief, but
in that brief Taylor asserts that whether AM-2201, one of the chemical
formulations of synthetic marijuana he sold, is a controlled substance is a
question of fact, and therefore the jury instructions were fundamentally erroneous
for not submitting such to the jury (a new issue), the state's evidence was
insufficient to show that AM-2201 was a controlled substance (supplementing an
issue raised in the Appellant's brief), and alternatively that he should get a new
trial to assert a mistake of law defense (also supplementing an issue raised in the
Appellant's brief). The state characterizes the new issue as:
4.

Has Taylor failed to demonstrate that the trial court committed
fundamental error in the jury instructions or that he is entitled to an
acquittal or new trial?

2

ARGUMENT
Taylor Is Entitled To Neither A New Trial Nor An Acquittal Based On His
Argument That Whether The Synthetic Marijuana Chemical Formulation Known
As AM-2201 Is A Controlled Substance Is A Factual Question

A.

Introduction
Relying upon the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Alley, 155

Idaho 972, 318 P.3d 962 (Ct. App. 2014), Taylor asserts that whether AM-2201 is
a controlled substance is a question of fact,
(Supplemental brief, pp. 4-6.)

rather than one of law.

From this premise he extrapolates that it was

fundamental error for the jury instructions to inform the jury that AM-2201 and
two other formulations of synthetic marijuana (which Taylor does not dispute are
controlled substances as a matter of law) are controlled substances as a matter
of law (supplemental brief, pp. 6-9), that he is entitled to an acquittal based on
insufficient evidence that AM-2201 is a controlled substance (supplemental brief,
pp. 9-10); and that he is entitled to a new trial to allow him to submit a mistake of
law defense to this factual question (supplemental brief, p. 11). This argument
fails because whether synthetic marijuana containing the formulation AM-2201 is
a controlled substance is a legal, not a factual question. Even if it were a factual
question, Taylor has failed to show fundamental error in the jury instructions,
insufficiency of the evidence, or error in the denial of his motion for a new trial to
assert a mistake of law defense.

B.

Standard Of Review
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law

over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140
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Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 405,
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004).
"In assessing the sufficiency of evidence, we will uphold a judgment of
conviction entered upon a jury verdict so long as there is substantial evidence
upon which a rational trier of fact could conclude that the prosecution proved all
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jones, 154
Idaho 412, 417, 299 P.3d 219, 224 (2013) (internal quotations omitted). The
appellate court will not substitute its view "as to the credibility of the witnesses,
the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the evidence." State v. Chacon, 145 Idaho 814,818, 186 P.3d 670,
674 (Ct. App. 2008).
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88,
261 P.3d 853, 864-65 (2011) (citing State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8
P.3d 652, 654 (2000)).

C.

The Question Of Whether Synthetic Marijuana Containing The Specific
Chemical Formulation AM-2201 Is A Controlled Substance Is A Legal
Question, Not A Factual One
"When interpreting statutes we begin with the literal words of a statute,

which are the best guide to determining legislative intent." Leavitt v. Craven, 154
Idaho 661, 667, 302 P.3d 1, 7 (2012) (internal quotes, brackets and citation
omitted). If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, "legislative history
and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering
the clearly expressed intent of the legislature."
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Verska v. Saint Alphonsus

Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889,893,265 P.3d 502,506 (2011). See
also Stringer v. Robinson, 155 Idaho 554,558,314 P.3d 609, 613 (2013) (court
"not at liberty to disregard the plain language of the Idaho Code"). An ambiguity
is not created merely because "two different interpretations of a statute are
presented," but a statute is ambiguous only where the "meaning is so doubtful or
obscure that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning."
Farmers Nat. 8ank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853, _ , 318 P.3d
622, 625 (2014) (quotations and citations omitted). Moreover, legislative intent,
including the analysis of the plain language, "should be derived from a reading of
the whole act at issue." kL (quotation and citation omitted).
Taylor was indicted for delivery of a controlled substance in violation of
I.C. § 37-2732(a). (R., pp. 490, 494.) That statute provides that "it is unlawful for
any person to ... deliver ... a controlled substance."

I.C. § 37-2732(a).

The

penalty for the crime is defined based on what schedule the drug falls in, with
delivery of a Schedule I nonnarcotic drug being a felony. I.C. § 37-2732(a)(8).
Thus, the elements of the crime are delivery of a Schedule I nonnarcotic
controlled sUbstance.

Schedule I, in turn, includes as a hallucinogenic

(nonnarcotic) controlled substance:
Tetrahydrocannabinols, or synthetic equivalents of the substances
contained in the plant, or in the resinous extractives of Cannabis,
sp. and/or synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with
similar chemical structure such as the following:

i.

Tetrahydrocannabinols:

ii.

The following synthetic drugs:
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a.
Any
compound
structurally
derived
from
3-(1naphthoyl)indole
or
1H-indol-3-yl-(1-naphthyl)methane
by
substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl ....
I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30) (2011).2

The statute also lists dozens (and possibly

hundreds) of specific chemical formulations of synthetic marijuana.

I.C. § 37-

2705(d)(30)(ii)(b-g) (2011).
In this case there is no dispute that AM-2201 is a "synthetic substance"
that mimics marijuana, "such as" the "synthetic drugs" "derived from 3-(1naphthoyl)indole or 1H-indol-3-yl-(1-naphthyl)methane by substitution at the
nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl." Taylor's only claim is that the actual
sUbstitution at the indole ring is not by an actual alkyl. (See supplemental brief,
pp. 4-5 (citing Alley).) The dispute between the testifying chemists was whether
the presence of a single flourine atom in the carbon chain substitution atom,
which all acknowledged made the molecule an alkyl halide, was properly
classified as an alkyl or a halide. (Compare Tr., vol. I, p. 101, L. 12 - p. 102, L.
2; p.174, L. 19-p. 176, L. 7 with p.194, L.12-p.195, L. 7.) Taylor has never
claimed that the difference between an alkyl and an alkyl halide actually makes
AM-2201 something other than a synthetic marijuana "such as" ones specified.
The plain language of Schedule I includes synthetic marijuana, regardless
of minor variations in the chemical formulation. First, the presence of a flourine
atom in the substitute at the indole ring does not mean that the "substitution" is
no longer "by alkyl" as that term is used in the statote. Rather, an alkyl halide

The 2011 amendment was in effect at the times relevant to this case. 2011
Idaho Session Laws, ch. 47, § 1, p. 109. A 2013 amendment is currently in
effect. I.C. § 37-2705(d)(31) (Supp. 2013).
2
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(such as the one at issue containing a flourine atom) is a subset of the alkyl
group. (See R., pp. 594-95; Tr., vol. I, p. 184, L. 7 - p. 202, L. 25; p. 207, L. 11 p. 252, L. 20.) Although chemists may differ (and did in this case) as to whether
an alkyl halide belongs in the alkyl group or the halide group, the question is what
the legislature intended. Given the obviously broad intent of the statute, it makes
little sense to give the single word "alkyl" its narrowest and most technical
meaning. The chemical formulation of AM-2201 is specifically covered by the
non-exhaustive chemical formulation list of controlled synthetic marijuana.
Moreover, the one atom difference, even if the term alkyl halide is not an
alkyl as that word was used by the legislature, does not change the reality that
AM-2201 is a formulation of synthetic marijuana "such as" a formulation
accomplished by substitution by an alkyl. The plain language of the statute is
clearly a comprehensive ban on synthetic marijuana, rather than a test of specific
chemical formulations controlled by an exclusive list, and the formula of synthetic
marijuana known as AM-2201 is therefore a Schedule I controlled substance.
Taylor's reliance on State v. Alley, 155 Idaho 972,318 P.3d 962 (Ct. App.
2014), for the proposition that whether the specific chemical formulation of
synthetic marijuana known as AM-2201 is a controlled substance is a factual
question, is misplaced. In that case the Court of Appeals noted that the parties
presented "conflicting expert testimony on the meaning of the technical term
'alkyl.'"

1st at _ , 318 P.3d at 968. After holding that the word alkyl "is

ambiguous" the Court of Appeals resorted first to "statutory construction" and
then the "rule of lenity" to interpret this single word of the statute.
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1st at _ , 318

P.3d at 968-69. Only after applying the rule of lenity to conclude this one word
should be defined as advocated by Alley did the Court of Appeals then turn to
"[o]ther portions" of the statute.

~

at _ , 318 P.3d at 970.

The Court of Appeals then looked at a primary clause of the statute in
isolation, concluded that rather than being a comprehensive ban on synthetic
marijuana, Schedule I created a fact question as to whether a formulation of
synthetic marijuana one atom different from the "compound structurally derived
from 3-( 1-naphthoyl)indole or 1H-indol-3-yl-( 1-naphthyl)methane by substitution
at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl" formulation had "similar chemical
structure." See ~ at _ , 318 P.3d at 971-72.
The flaw in the Court of Appeals' analysis is that it failed to follow the
mandate that legislative intent "should be derived from a reading of the whole act
at issue." Farmers Nat. Bank, 155 Idaho at _ , 318 P.3d at 625. The Court of
Appeals' divide and conquer approach of starting with a single word, then looking
at "other portions" of the statute (the main clause of the subsection at issue),
cannot be reconciled with the requirement that the legislative act should be
looked at as a whole. When looked at as a whole the only question is whether
the chemical formulation of AM-2201, which everyone agrees is synthetic
marijuana, is within the scope of Schedule I. Although there is a dispute as to
whether the SUbstitution at the indole ring was by alkyl (based on a disagreement
among chemists as to whether the term alkyl includes or excludes alkyl halides),
there is nothing suggesting that substitution by an alkyl halide rather than alkyl
means AM-2201 is not a formulation "such as" that listed, and therefore outside
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the scope of Schedule I. The legislature, by the plain language of the statute,
banned synthetic marijuana, and only provided the list of specific chemical
formulations as examples ("such as the following"). The Court of Appeals, by
analyzing first a single word of the statute contained in the "such as" list, and
then working backwards, made the examples the focus of the statute, and
reduced the primary language of the statute to a "catch-all.,,3
The plain language of this statute shows legislative intent to ban all
synthetic marijuana, regardless of its chemical formulations. It banned "synthetic
substances ... such as" the synthetic cannabinoids listed. I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30).
The one atom difference identified, even if it took AM-2201 out of the specific list
of "such as" chemical formulations, did not remove AM-2201 from Schedule I or
reduce the determination of whether the specific chemical formulation of
synthetic marijuana known as AM-2201 was a controlled substance to a factual
question. The statute requires a factual determination of only whether Taylor
delivered (or conspired to deliver, manufacture or possess with intent) synthetic
marijuana, which is a Schedule I controlled substance.
Finally, neither the plain language of the statute nor the legislative history
even suggest that the legislature intended that juries decide whether AM-2201 is

The Court of Appeals also applied the "similar chemical structure" language to
the "synthetic substances" phrase in the statute, even though it modifies the word
"isomers." Alley, 155 Idaho at _ , 318 P.3d at 971 ("Whether AM-2201 has a
similar chemical structure to one of the example substances listed under the
statute is a question of fact." (emphasis added)). The relevant language is
"synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical
structure such as the following: .... " I.C. § 37-2705(c)(30) (2011) (emphasis
added).
3
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a Schedule I controlled substance on a case-by-case basis.

The Court of

Appeals reasoned that a "majority of the federal courts that have addressed the
issue have also agreed that determining structural similarity of chemicals ... is a
question for the finder of fact." Alley, 155 Idaho at _ , 318 P.3d at 971. As
shown, the Idaho statute does not require a "determin[ation] [of the] structural
similarity of chemicals" but instead a determination of whether the product
delivered is a synthetic marijuana. The portion of the federal Analogue Act cited
by the Court of Appeals, id. at _ , 318 P.3d 318 P.3d at 971 n.5, defines
"controlled substance analogue" and states it is a substance "the chemical
structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled
sUbstance" and meets other requirements. 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(32)(A). The term
specifically excludes a "controlled substance" from being a "controlled substance
analogue."

21 U.S.C.A. § 802(32)(C)(i).

Because the federal statute is

fundamentally different than the Idaho statute, cases interpreting it are of little
utility in determining the scope and meaning of Idaho's ban on synthetic
marijuana.
Nor are the cases cited by the Court of Appeals instructive in their
analysis. In United States v. Bamburg, 478 F.3d 934, 939-41 (8 th Cir. 2007), the
court declined to consider the argument that the mental state element was
different for "'traditional'" controlled substances than for "'nontraditional' drugs
such as those covered by the Analogue Act" because any error was necessarily
harmless; that there was no "plain error" in the jury instruction on witness
credibility; and that the trial court's questions of the state's expert did not bias the
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defense. In United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257,1264 (11 th Cir. 2005), the
court noted that the trial court, after a bench trial, made factual findings that the
state's experts were credible, the defense witness lacked expertise, and the state
had "proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the chemical structure of 1,4butanediol is substantially similar to that of GHB."
upheld that finding of fact.

kL. at 1270-72.

The appellate court later

In United states

V.

Turcotte, 405 F.3d

515, 525-27 (yth Cir. 2005), the Court stated that "applying the standard
requirement that a defendant must know the substance in question is a
'controlled substance' is nonsensical since controlled substance analogues are,
by definition, not 'controlled substances'" and therefore the proper scienter
requirement is that the defendant "knew the substance in question was a
controlled substance analogue.,,4 In United States

V.

Roberts, 363 F.3d 118, 123

n.1 (2d Cir, 2004), the court merely listed the statutory elements of the Analogue
Act (including that the substance "was similar in structure and effect to a listed
controlled substance") in the context of a void for vagueness challenge.
United States

V.

In

Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118, 123 n.2 (2d Cir. 2004), the court noted

that the argument that it was an "improper delegation of legislative power" to
have the jury decide whether a substance is "substantially similar" to a controlled

This holding, that the defendant had to know the substance he possessed was
a controlled substance analogue, was rejected by the Fourth Circuit based on
contrary circuit precedent in United States V. McFadden, _
F.3d _ , 2014 WL
th
2109374 (4 Cir. 2014). Of course a requirement that Taylor knew that the
synthetic marijuana was "chemically similar" to listed chemical formulations of
synthetic marijuana would eviscerate the general intent requirements contained
in Idaho's drug control laws.
4
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substance, and therefore an analogue, was only a restatement of the appellant's
void for vagueness challenge.
The federal cases, dealing with a different statute, are ultimately unhelpful
in determining the intent of the Idaho legislature. There is nothing to suggest the
statutes at issue in this case were in any way modeled on the federal Analogue
Act. The cases, at best, note that the federal definition of analogue requires that
the analogue be chemically similar to a controlled substance but not be a
controlled substance itself, but do not address the issues raised in the present
case.

In short, the federal cases cited by the Court of Appeals are not

persuasive authority on the interpretation of the Idaho statutes at issue in this
case.
The plain language and legislative history of I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30) both
show legislative intent to make all synthetic marijuana ("spice") a controlled
substance.

The legislative list of specific chemical formulations of synthetic

marijuana is merely representative, and not exclusive. Nor is there support in the
statute for the conclusion that the legislature intended that the formulations
specifically listed are controlled substances as a matter of law, but that forms of
synthetic marijuana with slight chemical differences that do not change their
nature be subject to jury determination on a case-by-case basis whether they are
controlled or not. Because the statute makes synthetic marijuana, including AM2201, a Schedule I controlled substance, the Court of Appeals' decision in Alley,
and Taylor's arguments based thereon, must be rejected.

12

D.

Taylor Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error, In The
JUry Instructions
For the first time on appeal, in supplemental briefing, Taylor challenges

Jury Instruction 23, which states: "Under Idaho law synthetic cannabinoids,
including AM-2201, JWH-019, and JWH-210 are controlled substances." (R., p.
886.) Specifically, relying on the analysis in Alley that determination of whether
the chemical formulation of synthetic marijuana known as AM-2201 is a
controlled substance is a factual question resolved on a case-by-case basis,
Taylor argues the court should have submitted that factual question to the jury
instead of instructed it as a matter of law.

(Supplemental brief, pp. 4-6.)

Because whether AM-2201 is a controlled substance is not a factual question
resolved on a case-by-case basis, as set forth above, there is no error in the
instruction.
Even if the instruction was incorrect, however, Taylor has failed to show
fundamental error. "It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and
timely objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for
appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). To show fundamental error the appellant must
show that some action or inaction "(1) violates one or more of [her] unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless."
13

Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Although an instruction resolving a
factual question in the state's favor implicates a constitutional right, Taylor has
failed to show either clear or prejudicial error under the facts of this case.
The claimed error is not clear. First, at no point, either at trial or in relation
to the motion to dismiss, did Taylor claim that AM-2201 does not have "similar
chemical structure" to the synthetic marijuana formulations in the list.

It is

undisputed that AM-2201 is in fact a synthetic marijuana and, at most, only one
atom different from a formula specifically provided in the statutory list. Taylor
instead took the position that the list was exclusive, AM-2201 was not on the list,
and therefore it was not as a matter of law a controlled substance.

He had

nothing to gain from claiming that AM-2201 was a controlled substance if it had
"similar chemical structure" to the formulas in the list.
Second, it is far from clear that Alley is a correct statement of the law.
Prior to Alley there was no real reason to believe the statute made formulas for
synthetic marijuana on the "such as" list controlled substances as a matter of law
but formulas not specifically on the list to be decided as questions of fact. Before
Alley it was not clear that whether AM-2201 is a controlled substance is a factual
determination made on a case-by-case basis, and until decided by this Court that
question is still not settled.
Taylor has also failed to show any prejudice. The only evidence in this
case is that AM-2201 is a "synthetic cannabinoid" that is a "Schedule I controlled
substance." (Tr., vol. III, p. 2441, Ls. 14-23; p. 2449, L. 23 - p. 2450, L. 16; p.
2453, Ls. 17-20; p. 2458, L. 4 - p. 2459, L. 6; p. 2461, L. 20 - p. 2462, L. 9; p.
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2471, Ls. 6-22; p. 2481, L. 23 - p. 2483, L. 23; p. 2498, Ls. 15-22.) Taylor's
claim "there was no evidence produced at trial from which the jury could have
determined that AM-2201 has a similar chemical structure to one of the example
substances listed." (Supplemental brief, pp. 7-8) begs the question because to
expert witnesses testified it was a controlled substance.
In addition, Taylor does not dispute that the delivery and conspiracy
charges also cover synthetic marijuana with formulations known as JWH-019 and
JWH-210, which are indisputably synthetic marijuana as a matter of law. Thus,
any error in lack of a jury determination of whether AM-2201 is also a Schedule I
controlled sUbstance is necessarily harmless. Taylor argues that he would have
been able to successfully assert a mistake of fact defense regarding the JWH019 and JWH-210, but for the instruction. (Supplemental brief, p. 8.) Such an
argument is pure speculation.

Although a belief that the substance was

something that was legal to possess would be a defense, there is no basis for
claiming that a belief that the substance was a formulation that might be legal if
the jury does not find it "similar" to other formulations used in synthetic marijuana
would be a defense. Taylor never claimed, and presented no evidence, that he
thought the sUbstance was something other than synthetic marijuana. Taylor has
failed to show a likelihood of a different outcome.

E.

The Evidence Is Sufficient
Taylor asserts that "the state did not present proof that Mr. Taylor knew

the nature of the material delivered" and presented "no evidence whatsoever to
prove [he] had the requisite intent (knowledge) to commit" a conspiracy to
15

manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to deliver synthetic marijuana.
(Supplemental brief, pp. 9-10.) This is an extension of the argument that he had
to know that the substance was controlled, and that it was insufficient that he
merely thought the substance was synthetic marijuana.
Appellant's brief.)

(See generally

Taylor does not articulate how, even if Alley employed the

right analysis and there is a factual component to determining if AM-2201 is a
controlled substance, such would render the evidence insufficient. The evidence
is that Taylor knew exactly what he was dealing in: synthetic marijuana. (See R.,
pp. 1002-09.)

That he did not know exactly what chemical formulation of

synthetic marijuana, or thought the particular formula used was not illegal, does
not render the evidence insufficient.

F.

Taylor Is Not Entitled To A New Trial
Instruction No. 27 states: "When the evidence shows that a person

voluntarily did that which the law declares to be a crime, it is no defense that the
person did not know that the act was unlawful or that the person believed it to be
lawful." (R., p. 890.) Taylor asserts that this instruction was rendered incorrect
by Alley and therefore he is entitled to a new trial. Regardless of whether AM2201 is a controlled substance as a matter of fact or a matter of law, ignorance of
the law is still not a defense to the charges. (See Respondent's brief, pp. 6-14.)
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the
district court.

DATED this 30th day of May, 201

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of May, 2014, I caused two true
and correct copies of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF to be placed in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
DEBORAH WHIPPLE
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett
PO Box 2772
Boise, 1083701

KKJ/pm

17

